Titre |
Financing and Governance of Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) |
Auteurs |
BANGOURA Lansana [1],
TOBOSSI COSSI GILLES SYLVAIN [2],
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Journal: |
British Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences |
Catégorie Journal: |
Internationale |
Impact factor: |
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Volume Journal: |
5 |
DOI: |
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Resume |
The establishment of fictitious credits which is a sort of embezzlement of resources from the IMF by its leaders, for their own interests, creates problems of governance and has consequences to the profitability of MFIs. Under the hypothesis that the rate of fictitious credits outstanding credits of each MFI is private information, it may exist a problem of credit rationing on the donor’s part when they are intended the funding MFIs that have rates of fictitious credits lowest (the most socially efficient). To resolve this problem, lenders may offer a financing contract incentive in which each MFI sustain a cost of funding equal to the cost of social inefficiency (transferred as bonus to its customers). This type of contract leads each MFI to reveal his true type and protects customers against any future social cost. The fictitious loans in the microfinance sector can have two consequences: the first is related to the questioning of the social responsibility of MFIs and the second is the undermining of the social objective of donors. We think that a contract incentive funding will enable the IMF to assume its social responsibility and to achieve the objective of his mission utility and social efficiency. |
Mots clés |
MFI financing, Governance, Social Efficiency, Social Responsibility, Asymmetric Information. |
Pages |
1 - 11 |
Fichier |
(PDF) |